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Foreword
Since the 11 April symposium a number of important developments have taken place, both domestically
and internationally, that serve to underscore the arguments advanced in this report.  
Internationally the shift in the American orientation in Iraq from war-fighting to peacebuilding and the
expanded role of NATO in providing a secure environment in Afghanistan have shown how roles of
militaries are evolving, and how the expectations of the international community are changing. The role
of arm ed forces as strict fighting elements is only a fiction.  The fact that the majority  of US fatalities in
Iraq have occurred after the cessation of “war-fighting” illustrates the changing nature of armed conflict. 
This supports our argum ent that a defence review will necessitate the adoption of a new force structure
commensurate with Canada’s place in the world, its perceived roles and responsibilities, and the nature of
threats it is likely to face.
In terms of the newly expanded role of NATO in Afghanistan, as well as the progress being made in the
European defence collaboration, we can see the continued move towards the “coalitions of the willing”. 
This represents the recognition that few states are capable of unilateral military action, either morally or
functionally.  Thus, the need to field a complete range of combat capabilities is decreasing at the same
time as the cost of doing so becomes nearly impossible for all but a minority of states to bear.  Canada
must make decisions about what capabilities it is prepared to invest in, and which units it will be willing
to rely on like-minded states to provide.  Additionally, while Canada’s place in NATO should be debated
it is our assertion that NATO remains integral to Canadian security planning.
Canada’s recent announcement that HMCS Toronto will be deployed to the Middle East in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom demonstrates that the operational tempo for the Canadian Forces is likely
to remain high.  Rather than undercutting the observations made at the symposium, and the arguments
made within this document, these events all reinforce our assertion that a comprehensive review of
Canada’s foreign and defence policies is required.
Finally, recent announcements have been made about Canada’s ongoing negotiations with the United
States on Ballistic Missile Defence.  The details of these discussions, while not yet public, reflect the
importance of the United States to Canadian security needs.  However, it is our assertion that with other
major shifts in Canadian security thinking, any decisions must be made in reference to a comprehensive
review of Canada’s desired role in the world.  
In addition to the events on the world stage a number of crucial developments have taken place
domestically.  The new Canadian government has made some preliminary declarations of impending
foreign and defence policy reviews.  While formal announcements of these reviews will likely follow the
next federal election, planning for these reviews must begin now, both within the relevant departments
and within the private sector.  Here our arguments for a foreign policy review to precede a defence review
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are both timely and crucial.  A debate about Canada’s defence needs which follow from the state’s foreign
policy will be essential to establish the basis for a relevant and sustainable Canadian Forces (CF).
The government also has announced the creation of a new Ministry of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness, though ultimately what it will look like, what its roles and responsibilities will be, or how it
will navigate the perennial debates of provincial versus federal responsibilities have yet to be determined. 
Certainly the pending movement of some offices from DND to the new ministry will effect the CF,
though the exact nature of these effects are yet to be felt.  Additionally the appointment by the Prime
Minister of a secretary on Reserve issues to the Minister of National Defence will also be a harbinger for
changes in the roles of the Canadian Reserves.
These developments, which have taken place since the 11 April meeting, have served to highlight the
arguments that were made by the conference’s participants and by this document’s authors.  Rather than
eroding the need for foreign and defence reviews, the changing international and domestic environment
reinforce our call for comprehensive, public, and transparent foreign and defence reviews.
Background
The York Centre for International and Security Studies (YCISS) initiated an ongoing project in the spring
of 2003 to critically examine Canada’s defence needs. The “Critical Defence Project” was born in
response to the Department of National Defence’s Defence Update, which was viewed as being
insufficient to providing Canada with a relevant force for the emerging security concerns. YCISS hosted a
conference at the Canadian Forces College on 11 April 2003, which brought together a select group of
academics from across Canada, drawn primarily from Security and Defence Forum (SDF) centres, to
discuss the questions of what a re-conception of security policy would mean for the organisation of the
Canadian Forces, and how critical perspectives could make concrete policy recommendations for the CF.
While the participants approached the topics from a range of perspectives, there was a broad underlying
belief that the status quo was having a negative impact on the capacity of the CF to fulfil its assigned
missions, and that the security environment facing Canada today is dramatically different from the one
present in the early 1990s when the last Defence Review was undertaken. The conference successfully put
a series of questions on the table for debate (Appendix 2) and the discussions that emerged illustrated the
need for an ongoing project that will examine the issues of Canadian security and defence policy more
deeply. It was evident to participants that the government requires a comprehensive defence review to
address the growing gap between the capabilities the CF has and the roles it is increasingly being called
upon to perform.
This policy paper is based on the discussions that took place at our April meeting, but does not
necessarily  represent the views of all of the participants. W hat we have set out to demonstrate is that a
defence review is required and that it must commence with an examination of what Canada’s security
needs are prior to an examination of the threats that are, or may be, present. After these core arguments,
we present one view of how a reconception of Canada’s security needs in the context of the current and
emerging international environment will result in changes in the manner in which the Canadian Forces are
organised. Covering the range from domestic security through human security and international peace and
security challenges including the traditional forms of robust military force, this policy paper advocates a
re-organisation of the Canadian Forces that would ensure its continued viability, relevance, and
effectiveness as a modern military.
Dialogue contributions indicate an underlying
desire for a more integrated foreign policy
framework that clearly articulates Canadian
values and interests, that is capable of
achieving core objectives, and that is fully
cognizant of Canada’s international situation
and responsibilities.
- A Dialogue of Foreign Policy: A Report to
Canadians
Canada Needs a Foreign Policy and Defence Review
The current guidance for military planning is the 1994 Defence White Paper, a document which does not
adequately reflect the national and international security concerns which confront Canada. The document,
while backing away from a number of spending initiatives contained in the 1989 White Paper, is
nevertheless grounded in a security environment defined by competing world powers. Within such a
security arrangement Canada’s defence needs were not altered substantially from the 1989 declaration.
Canada is said to still require a comprehensive multi-role combat force capable of fighting with the best
and against the best. Furthermore, the emphasis is placed on the country’s need to fight as a coherent
Canadian force within any such coalition. This is a significant issue as it precludes Canada from
abandoning any combat capability. 
What we see is that Canada’s defence needs are defined by the guiding White Paper which establishes the
broad needs of the Canadian Forces and proscribes the limits of the debate of what the CF should look
like. In turn the White Paper is based on an understanding of what Canada’s security interests are. In
contrast to the process that led to the 1994 Defence Review, we believe that a review of Canada’s defence
needs must begin with an analysis of our security needs, and then examine the global environment. 
Core Recommendations
1. The Canadian Governm ent must embark on a full foreign policy review
The Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) recently completed
its “Dialogue on Foreign Policy”. This process
illustrated the need for a full review of foreign
policy. The Report to Canadians clearly lays out
the complexity of foreign policy in today’s
international environment and reflects the desire
of the Canadian public for a complete review of
Canada’s priorities. Of particular note within the
document is the increased awareness and
sensitivity of Canadians to the place of security in Canadian foreign and defence policy, as well as an
appreciation for the link between them. Canada’s defence posture and the force structure which
accompanies it cannot be addressed in isolation from a debate about Canada’s place in the world and the
type of role Canadians wish the country to play internationally. At the same time a security and defence
policy must be made in the context of Canada’s international relations, placing emphasis on our
relationship with the United States.
The Dialogue on Foreign Policy was clear in stating that many Canadians desire the country to play an
increased role in promoting its values abroad, and that Canada has a responsibility to protect peoples from
Canadian Defence Policy: Some Critical Considerations / 5
violence. This position has also been articulated by Prime Minister Jean Chretien and by the Canadian-
sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which advocates that
developed nations have a responsibility to protect people from genocide, mass rape, and ethnic cleansing.
The desire of Canadians for a human security policy that is pro-active has crucial implications for the
manner in which Canada will act internationally, and the Canadian Forces which would be an important
tool in a more activist foreign policy.
A foreign policy review will enable the government and people of Canada to change the direction in
which the country will proceed over the next generation, and to articulate what Canada’s role will be in
the increasingly fragmented international environment. The review would provide a sense of where
Canada’s interests lie, whether in closer ties with the United States, increased reliance on multilateralism
on an issue and regional basis, in a revitalised United Nations, or as is most likely, some combination of
these options. Further, the foreign policy review will help identify future risks and threats to Canada and
to define the manner in which Canada is likely to respond. The relationship between foreign affairs and
national defence is complex and is evolving. Just as the CF is not the only instrument available to
government to address security challenges, so too the role and significance of the CF now extends beyond
the confines of national defence and security.
2. A Defence Review is required to provide direction to the Department of National Defence and
the Canadian Forces and to ensure that the organisation is in a position to respond to the
government’s calls to action.
The recently completed Defence Update was counter productive to the needs of the Canadian Forces and
missed a crucial opportunity to re-orient the CF structure to today’s multi-faceted and complex security
environment. The Update Process was not designed to solicit useful input, but was rather set up in such a
way as to  direct respondents to particular answers. Furthermore, the format precluded asking difficult
questions about Canadian security needs and cut short any debate on the shape of the Department of
National Defence. Rather than having a forward-looking process, the findings of the Defence Update
were clear in asserting that the assumptions made in the 1994 White Paper were still valid. This statement
was made in spite of the dramatic shifts in the Canadian security environment over the past decade. The
use of the Canadian Navy to protect fish stocks, the emergence of new robust forms of peacekeeping such
as was seen in Kosovo, Haiti, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the tragedy that befell Rwanda, through the
emergence of non-state terrorism  as a threat to Canadian interests are all examples of how our security
environment has altered substantially since the 1994 White Paper. Clearly, continuing to plan and operate
on the basis of a Defence plan that was based primarily on fending off a major military power is no longer
the only, or perhaps even the main, defence need today. A defence review with active public consultation
following a foreign policy review is necessary to ensure that the country has the forces in place that are
most likely to be of use over the next fifteen to twenty years.
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The Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians showed wide spread support for the Canadian
military and a recognition of its important role as a tool of foreign policy. Following a formal review of
Canada’s international role, the Department of National Defence should be able to establish a force
structure that is able to meet the demands placed upon it by the Canadian government. The CF is being
called upon to intervene in intense conflict zones, and must have the resources necessary to  operate in
these situations. The military must be able to engage in the spectrum of operations from pre-emption
through war-fighting to peacekeeping and to peacebuilding. At the same time it must retain an ability to
operate alongside its allies and maintain a relevance to its NATO allies, especially the United States. Our
privileged position and our history, no less than our geographic locale, demands this of us; that is, unless
the Government of Canada decides fundamentally to alter its commitments concerning international peace
and security operations and hence its expectations and demands of the CF.
While the Canadian Forces cannot do all things, especially if it is to function effectively given its current
force structure and capacity, it must retain some significant combat capability. A defence review would
enable planners to establish in which areas Canadian commitments can make a difference to international
engagements in support of peace and security.
Canadian Security Policy
Canada’s Security Needs
In some treatments, national and international security policies together provide an umbrella under which
foreign and defence policy fall. Others use security policies to serve as the lynch-pin between foreign
policy and defence policy. Admittedly, neither view is universally acknowledged, but an articulation of
Canada’s security needs and international security interests is a crucial precursor to  establishing what its
roles will be and from which its force structure can be developed. Security is a contested idea, perhaps
more so today than any recent period. Global politics have changed dramatically since the Cold War, and
security definitions rooted within a bi-polar conception of international relations are no longer relevant
and should not be the basis of defence planning. The threats to Canada can no longer be defined
exclusively by looking at foreign militaries; the number of states which possess a combat capability that
could conceivably represent a threat to Canada or its allies is quite sm all, and reduces quickly to next to
zero when you ask which states would willingly engage in hostile acts. The threat of former Soviet forces
is limited if not non-existent and there is no obvious current successor to the threat. A security policy that
is centred only on countering advanced militaries will not be sufficient in the foreseeable future. If the old
approach to security is no longer relevant, then what are Canada’s security interests?
The definition of security must begin with a statement of what is to be secured, rather than commencing
from an assessment of risks. It is only through this process that the threats can be determined along with a
suitable response.
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It is our view that Canada’s security relies on an international environment that is stable and peaceful. The
best way to maintain such an environment is through the promotion of democratic governance, respect for
human rights and the maintenance of human dignity. It should be clear from this that Canada’s security
policy must rest on an activist foreign policy that promotes the conditions for peace and security. All this
is consistent with Canadian policy since Louis St. Laurent’s 1947 Grey Lectures.
However, in the post Cold War world security of the country – its people, values, and institutions – no
longer is, if ever it really was, the sole responsibility of the Department of National Defence. Canada’s
position as an advanced industrialised country with a high standard of living comes with responsibilities.
The placement of such a notion of security closer to the heart of Canadian security thinking will have
important implications for the force structure of the Canadian Forces.
Canada’s security needs can be defined by:
• a stable and peaceful international environment where dignity and security of peoples are
assured;
• an international system governed by the rule of law;
• the prevention and amelioration of acts of violence against Canada and its allies; and
• the protection of Canadian citizens within Canada from acts of violence and disasters
beyond the ability of civilian agencies to handle immediately.
Canada’s Place in the W orld
Canada enjoys one of the highest standards of living in the world. Residing in North America we are
faced with no immediate state-level threat to the country. At the same time Canada shares the continent
with the United States; a relationship which has profound effects on Canadian foreign policy. The
bilateral relationship between Canada and the US dominates Canadian international relations and should
remain a priority in our thinking on security matters. In this we must consider how our policies will affect
our neighbour as well as how we can contribute to American security. Our economic relations with the
US must be considered in making defence decisions. For example, this relationship must be considered
when examining Canada’s involvement in NORAD and NATO. However, while not uncritically
accepting and supporting American initiatives, when Canada does determine it is appropriate to act, it can
gain credibility without compromise by fulfilling particular roles which the US cannot or will not
undertake within the global division of security labour.
The International Character of Canadian Security
The international character of Canadian defence is not only a result of the diffusion of threats to Canada
or of the global dimensions of trade, investment and migration, but also arises from the changing nature
of what it is to be Canadian. The centrality of Europe to Canada’s defence is slowly waning. While
Europe is, and will remain, a major trading partner, Asia has become an increasingly significant part of
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For Canada, the search for multilateral ways
to encourage peace and preserve stability is
not an option - is an essential element of our
national interest and of our foreign policy.
-Defence White Paper, 1994, p. 12
Canada’s economic and trade profile. Moreover, the changing patterns of Canadian demographics are
having profound, but poorly studied, effects on Canada’s social, economic, and political life, including in
the Canadian military. Of interest is the manner in which Canada is being encouraged to consider
overseas activities at least in part out of demands from Canadians that the government take action to
promote peace and stability in the homelands of immigrants. This is a process that in some ways is similar
to the manner in which Canadians were urged to participate in two world wars. All this is occurring at the
same time as we witness both a connectedness with and vulnerability to the global community. The
increasingly globalized nature of goods and services, and the manner in which terror is able to transcend
state borders to transmit conflict out of its original geographic sphere is also forcing Western states to
take notice of conflicts throughout the developing world. These trends all combine to demand an
increasingly international outlook by DND for questions of Canadian security.
It should be clear that the security of Canada and the international stability upon which it relies is
increasingly susceptible to social unrest throughout the developing world. The implication of the
internationalisation of Canadian defence is that the military has to be capable of expeditions to rem ote
parts of the world, and of operating in relative isolation from the infrastructures provided by developed
states. Furthermore, the force structure of the CF must be such that missions to the developing world are
possible
Domestic Impacts on Canadian Security and Defence Policy
Canadian defence and security policy is directly affected by Canadian society. The domestic impact on
how we think about defence and security is a crucial variable in establishing a defence policy. Canada has
enjoyed nearly 50 years of peace, and the people of Canada do not need to fear a war on Canadian soil. At
the same time Canada is a country of immigrants, many of whom  have left countries where the military
does not protect society, but is rather the source of insecurity. The result is that there is little evident
support for a drastically larger military. When this is combined with the affluent society within which we
live, recruitment and retention into the CF is, and is likely to remain, an ongoing concern.
Canadian Defence, Multilateralism and Collective Defence
Canada remains an industrially-advanced state
with  a vast territory combined with a relatively
small population concentrated along a narrow
band along its southern border with the United
States. While it may be necessary to better
manage land border and coastal transit, military
invasion is not an issue. The ability of the
Canadian Forces to defend Canada against a modern military is simply illusory; at the same time there is
no traditional military threat facing Canada. The implication is that the focus on defending Canada need
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not be the primary role of the Canadian Forces. At the same time, Canadian security rests on both
boundary control and international stability, and as such Canada is a partner to collective and multilateral
security organisations aimed at maintaining global peace. The reliance on multilateralism and collective
defence should continue to underpin the Canadian Defence Policy. NORAD, NATO, and the UN all have
been crucial components to Canadian security.
These organisations were born or evolved during the Cold W ar and are struggling to maintain relevance
to Canada. This does not mean that Canada should withdraw; rather Canada must strive to make them
relevant to its security needs and to ensure they are positioned to respond to emerging security threats.
Canada should continue to contribute to these organisations, but must also initiate dialogues with the
organizations and the member states to examine where Canada can best contribute to the organization.
This is a process that has been supported by NATO which has encouraged the adoption of specialized
capabilities amongst its members, recognizing that few of the participants are capable of providing the
full range of combat forces.
The United Nations
The United Nations is the only multilateral organization that can claim broad legitimacy due to its
inclusive state membership. As such it is the organization within which Canada should focus much of its
security interests. The promotion of human dignity and security is the best guarantee for future Canadian
prosperity. A great deal has been made about the relative decline of the United Nations as a security
apparatus over the past decade. Certainly, there has been a decline in the number of troops engaged in
peacekeeping under the auspices of the UN. This, however, makes the mistake of assuming that the
promotion of international security comes primarily through the use of military force. While armed troops
have been necessary in a number of instances, they are required when other forms of security promotion
have failed and the military is turned to as a last resort. Furthermore, this debate also ignores the manner
in which peacekeeping has evolved and that the role the UN has played in the process of peace promotion
has changed.
Robust peacekeeping, sometimes referred to as peacemaking, requires a far more advanced command
structure than the UN is able to field. Instead lead nations or NATO have come to fill the void and to field
the necessary troops to engage in operations such as in Bosnia and Kosovo. As the necessity increases for
the deployment of troops capable of the full range of combat, the number of potential state contributors
rapidly declines, eliminating many of the militaries that have traditionally sent troops to the blue-beret
peacekeeping missions.
The move to collective defence organizations, such as the EU and NATO, providing the military
command and control of operations to peacekeeping missions is unlikely to change in the foreseeable
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future. This does not represent a decline in the United Nation’s relevance, but rather an evolution of the
relationship between it and regional security organizations.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation has been the centre piece of Canadian collective defence thinking
for the past 50 years. Despite the slow response of the organisation to the post cold-war environment it
has managed to maintain relevance to Canadian security . It continues to provide a multilateral security
arrangement that ties North American and European defence needs. The accelerating cost of maintaining
a modern fighting force has been defrayed by some pooling of resources. As a member of the alliance
Canada has access to a range of capabilities that it would be unable to field on its own. The Airborne
Warning and Air Control System (AWACS), of which Canada is a principal contributor, is but one high-
technology high-maintenance system. Furthermore, NATO has demonstrated its use both in its role in
aiding the defence needs of the United States, and directly for Canada in providing Operational Planning
and Headquarter assistance for the Canadian deployment to Afghanistan. NATO is no longer confined to
the defence of the NATO members, and has grown into a military alliance willing and capable of
deployment in support of peace operations outside of Europe.
The usefulness of NATO is further demonstrated by Canada’s role in the French-led European Union
(EU) mission to the Congo. While this is not a NATO mission, it is receiving operational support from
NATO through the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Planning Europe (SHAPE). Furthermore, Canada’s
ability to quickly integrate into the force is a direct result of its participation in NATO which has
demanded interoperability with its allies and has provided experience working alongside the European
states. The complementary equipment, supply system, and command and control systems have been
invaluable assets for Canada’s international role that have emerged from its participation in NATO.
NATO needs to continue to emerge as a leader in peacekeeping and peace support missions. The
Canadian Governm ent should continue to press the organization to evolve along these lines which also
will augur well for enhanced capacity in support of human security challenges.
Canada should:
• reaffirm its commitment to NATO;
• work with like-minded countries to guide the organisation towards more peacekeeping
responsibilities; and
• contribute troops to niche areas that meet both Canadian and NATO security needs.
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Canadian Domestic Security - Assistance to Civilian Agencies
Of all of the parts of the 1994 White Paper, the domestic role of the Canadian Forces is the most out of
date and most abbreviated portion of Canadian security planning. At the same time, the emerging
awareness of the threat of non-state terrorism forces a re-examination of the place of the Canadian Forces
in domestic security. In terms of interoperability a great deal has been done to ensure the ability of the CF
to work alongside the NATO allies. In contrast, surprisingly little has been done to make sure that the CF
can work readily alongside Canadian civilian counterparts. The CF is well suited to respond to massive
disasters, providing a highly disciplined and highly trained force for rapid deployment to emergencies, as
has been demonstrated in the Winnipeg floods, the Swiss Air disaster, and the Quebec Ice Storm.
The Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2), which is discussed in greater length later, provides one excellent counter-
terrorism tool to the Canadian government. However, in planning for disaster assistance and counter-
terrorism, the CF is hampered by a lack of mandate to gather intelligence and plan for domestic
operations. With proper civilian oversight and in co-ordination with other relevant agencies and
departments, this ability must be put in place to ensure that the CF is prepared for disasters within
Canada. Furthermore, greater training must be done to ensure that the procedures and policies are in place
to facilitate an efficient and rapid response to any emergency. This does not mean that the CF would
become the lead agency for civil emergencies, but rather that it could integrate more effectively into the
response mechanism to aid and assist civilian organisations. Therefore, to increase the effectiveness of the
CF in civil emergencies the following steps should be taken:
• provide legislative mandate for planning for disaster assistance and counter-terrorism
within Canada;
• engage in regular training exercises between Canadian Reserve Units and provincial and
municipal emergency response agencies such as the RCMP, the OPP and the Sûreté de
Québec; and




Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, terrorism, and in particular the growing
capacity of non-state terrorism , has been at the centre of debates on security. The responses to both state
(or state-sponsored) and non-state terrorism must be multifaceted and focus on prevention through
economic and political development assistance abroad and the strengthening of human security abroad.
At the same time Canada must be prepared to respond to the threats of state and non-state terrorism  both
within Canada and abroad. Within Canada the primary responsibility resides with CSIS and policing
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agencies. However, it is clear that the CF also has a crucial role to play. The threats posed by state and
non-state terrorism are virtually  non-existent in the 1994 Defence White Paper, and is mentioned only
briefly under the “Other Defence Related Activities - Assistance to Civilian Authority” heading. Counter-
terrorism has become a central role of the CF since 2001, and is poorly covered within the Defence White
Paper. The nature of these newly heightened security challenges calls into question the relevance of large
military organisations to respond to these particular threats. There is a disjunction between threats which
are horizontally integrated phenomena and responding organizations which are basically  vertically
integrated. What has been seen is that the small commando unit JTF2 is our most capable military asset in
the fight against international non-state terrorism. Furthermore, the risk of non-state terrorism demands
that Canada improve its intelligence sharing between organizations, allowing the CF access to domestic
intelligence, and that the ability of the CF to respond to an emergency be improved.
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
There is a healthy debate on whether the current advances in Command, Control, Communications,
Computers and Information (C 4I) represents a true Revolution in Military Affairs. However, it is clear that
the cost of acquiring and maintaining cutting edge technology is becoming increasingly prohibitive for all
but the largest defence budgets. Even the United States is now forced to consider trade-offs in acquiring
military technology. Countries such as Canada, with modest defence budgets, are faced with serious
financial obstacles in acquiring the most up-to-date equipment, and certainly cannot do so across the
spectrum of military systems. Canada can no longer afford to do all things, a position which it shares with
the majority of its NATO allies. The recent Prague Summit advanced the ideal of embracing niche
capabilities amongst the organization’s member states. The pursuit of a niche implies making a choice
that one will have to live with for many years to come. However, by understanding the risks involved in
making such a choice and adopting risk mitigation strategies, a flexible yet focussed force structure may
be adopted.
Canada’s decisions about which technologies it will adopt must grow out of a decision of which
capabilities it needs to meet its security needs. At the same time the capabilities that Canada fields must
be fully interoperable with its allies, allowing for the rapid integration of forces in multilateral operations.
This is increasingly important given the rising cost of fielding a combat capable military. There are only a
handful of states able to head a combat operation at or above the divisional level. Canada must be able to
bring core capabilities to NATO that are of use in its planning and operations.
Canadian Defence Policy: Some Critical Considerations / 13
Canadian Intelligence Community
It is the intelligence capabilities of a state that provide much of the informational basis for the foreign and
defence agencies as well as domestic security and policing, allowing the country to act in an effective and
timely fashion. Canada must strive towards the prevention of conflict primarily through economic and
political assistance, but with the ability to use the military as a last resort to provide for human security.
This policy places an increased emphasis on Canada’s intelligence community, because it demands that
the agencies have a broad focus across the globe and an ability to understand dynamic political
environments. Currently Canada’s intelligence gathering and interpretation takes place in a wide range of
departments, each of which tailors its roles to the particular government department’s needs. DFAIT,
DND, the Communication Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian International Development Agency,
and Citizenship and Immigration Canada all conduct intelligence gathering on the international stage,
with police agencies across the country, Revenue Canada and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
all providing domestic intelligence. Unfortunately the co-ordination between these departments is lacking
at present, with  the assembly of the total intelligence picture being developed in an ad-hoc fashion within
the Privy Council Office. 
Canadian security depends on the formation of a formal mechanism to share intelligence across
Government departments to assemble the most comprehensive picture possible, and then there must be a
structure which ensures co-ordinated appropriate action.
Canadian Force Structure
The force structure of a military must be such that it provides the resources to the government to meet the
defence needs of the state. The force structure then must be developed according to the security policy of
the state and the expected or anticipated threats. The development of a relevant force structure is crucial
to allow Canada to fulfil its foreign policy goals. The current force structure of the Canadian Forces will
not allow it to meet the demands likely to be placed upon it in the years to come. Indeed the crisis of
manning military operations indicates that the force structure already has reached its limit of usefulness.
In considering a relevant force structure we have sought to balance the likely demands to be placed upon
the CF with a respect for the fiscal limits the Canadian public places on the military. The construction of a
force structure appropriate to Canada’s capabilities and responsibilities is fundamental to our place in the
international community. In this brief paper we can only begin the discussion. A serious analysis requires
a full engagement of social, economic, and political factors along with a critical examination of doctrine
and of operational contexts. Future conferences and workshops could prove useful in carrying out an
analysis of all the various recommendations. 
It must be stressed that we are not advocating a military that is less expensive for the Canadian public, but
rather one that is more cost-effective. The rapid increase in defence technology comes attached to a high
cost of both procurement and maintenance. Furthermore, as war-fighting becomes increasingly reliant on
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high-technology the cost of training soldiers, sailors and air-personnel will continue to grow. While
defence is only one component of a Canadian security policy, it is nevertheless important and costly. To
fulfil our responsibilities as a developed and comparatively privileged and wealthy state it is essential that
we possess the tools necessary to aid in the establishment of international peace and stability.
The tentative initial recommendations for changes to the Canadian Forces are broad in scope and are
presented here to help shape the debate on what the CF should look like in preparing for the next 20
years. Particular attention will need to be paid to the case of procurement decisions that have provided
equipment to the CF which is either of marginal use, or of questionable relevance given the cost of the
platforms. Discussions of hard numbers have been eschewed in favour of a general debate of capabilities.
The following recommendations do not reflect the view of all of the participants at the Critical Defence
Symposium, but are representative of the majority. 
Ability to Lead Deployments and Provide Rapid Response
The entrenchment of human security necessitates the ability to rapidly deploy forces to remote parts of the
world. Security crises can develop quickly and require rapid response in order to prevent the escalation or
development of violence. At the same time there is an apparent ambivalence by many capable states to
lead missions to areas of the world that are viewed as being outside their strategic purview. Thus, the
provision of security requires that Canada maintain the ability to command and control operations abroad.
Furthermore, the CF must be capable of operating in the range of combat environments and be able to
sustain itself in highly volatile and violent regions of the world.
The Canadian expeditionary capability should then be:
• combat capable;
• rapidly deployable;
• able to operate independently for short periods of time; and
• capable of filling a range of roles from full combat to peacebuilding.
Strategic Lift - Air and Sea
A string of controversies has shed light on the shortcomings of Canada’s military to provide strategic lift
capabilities. Within Canada the small size of Canada’s military has necessitated the concentration of
troops in a small number of bases which are generally removed from the population centres of Canada.
For example, the lack of army units west of Edmonton precludes their rapid deployment to Vancouver or
Victoria. By the same token Halifax is a four hour drive from CFB Gagetown. Without domestic strategic
lift craft the deployment of the troops within Canada would be quite slow and would be unlikely to arrive
during the initial phase of a civil emergency. While the need for the rapid deployment of military assets in
Canada fortunately has not been an issue, the military has been extremely hampered in its ability to
deploy abroad, relying on the strategic air lift of the United States, or on leasing a sea lift capability. In
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both instances the rapid availability of the resources is not guaranteed, and in the case of air lift is
dependent on the US support of the Canadian policy at that time. This represents a serious reduction of
independent governm ent action. Recent moves to enter into leasing arrangements with NATO allies could
help address this problem, but any such agreement must allow the unfettered access of aircraft to Canada
to avoid the problems that faced the NATO deployment of AWACS aircraft to Turkey. Having to secure
NATO assent for a non-NATO Canadian-led mission abroad is not an acceptable policy. Furthermore,
plans to replace the Canadian Navy’s replenishment vessels with a larger vessel capable of providing a
large sea-lift capability should be pursued.
A domestic capability of providing strategic air and sea lift capabilities is a crucial component of
maintaining an independent foreign policy and is essential to providing the timely deployment of the CF
to stem violence and prevent the escalation of civil strife.
Canadian Army Force Structure
A reworking of Canadian security policy will define the broad types of operations within which Canada is
likely to find itself. Currently the CF is structured to fight a mechanised war in Europe alongside its
NATO allies, but as an independent organisation, a policy that was reflected in the recent brigade level
live-fire exercise held at CFB Wainwright. The Army’s brigade structure provides for a ratio of types of
troops that is inconsistent with the experiences of the Canadian Forces over the past 20 years, let alone the
likely involvement in the foreseeable future. The worries of over-working Canadian service personnel,
seen in statements by the general staff and within the media, are a result of a high operational tempo, but
have been worsened by the fact that many Canadian combat arms troops are simply not being deployed
because they are inappropriate for the missions. The artillery and heavy armoured regiments have not
seen use and are not likely to be used in peacekeeping operations. Notably, the deployment in
Afghanistan that was a com bat mission and continues today did not see the use of either of these
resources. The maintenance of the present staffing levels within these elements should therefore be
reconsidered. The limited financial and personnel resources could perhaps be more usefully re-deployed.
At the same time as these groups have seen very low levels of deployments, the communications, combat
engineers, and armoured reconnaissance units have been over tasked. 
Any Defence Review must consider the impact of its recommendations on both the service personnel and
their families. The social environment within which we live demands that the government ensure that the
lives of the military families are affected as little as possible by the demands placed on the CF. Families
are directly affected by the increased operational tempo of the military and have little or no control over
their fates. The social upheaval of families and the impact of returning service men and women who have
encountered extreme levels of violence can create a host of domestic problems and exacerbate existing
family stresses. A more efficient use of CF members would lessen the devastating impact that the current
arrangement has on the CF families that have been most affected by the recent stepped-up operations. The
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impact on the families of the service personnel must be placed at the fore of any CF restructuring, and a
significantly improved effort must be made to ensure a safe and stable environment is provided to spouses
and children.
At same time as the defence review will allow a reconception of the military force structure, the increased
focus on rapid reaction further demands a reconfiguration of Canada’s armed forces. Canada committed
itself to the United Nations on 15 December 1996 to contribute to the Standby High Readiness Brigade
(SHIRBRIG) in cooperation with Austria, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden.
Additionally, NATO recently has embarked on a major reorganization that is focused on providing Very
High Readiness troops capable of deployment within 48 hours, an ability Canada does not have. Yet these
are the types of troops that would be of use in the immediate stages of a crisis, whether war-fighting,
humanitarian intervention in the midst of violent conflict, or even in extreme types of disaster responses.
Canadian Navy Force Structure
The Canadian Navy has fared better than either the Air Force or Army in procurement over the past
decade. The Minor Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs), the Halifax class frigates, and the Victoria Class
submarines have all been recent additions to the fleet. The Navy will have to be positioned to continue its
roles in coastal surveillance and interdiction, and alongside its allies in the range of naval operations from
surveillance, through interdiction to full combat. The size of Canada’s ocean territory requires an
efficiently run navy that is capable of operating for extended periods of time away from the home ports.
As such the possession of replenishment vessels is essential for the viability of the fleet. At the same time,
as was discussed in the section on strategic lift, the vessels that will replace the current AORs should have
the ability to act as a roll-on roll-off carrier for the support of expeditionary activities. Finally there is an
issue with respect to the replacement of Canada’s four destroyers which are rapidly approaching the end
of their serviceable life span. The air-defence capability that is provided by these platforms must be
present in the Canadian Navy if it is to operate on its own in a combat environment. Furthermore, to fill
an operational command the command and control capabilities that are present on the destroyers will have
to be replaced.
While the surface fleet is crucial to Canada, the issue of the submarine fleet needs to be re-examined.
These vessels, though likely to be fully operational within a matter of years, do not meet Canada’s
security needs. The cost of maintaining the submarines is quite high and those resources could more
usefully be spent on maintaining the surface fleet which is capable of sustaining operations at sea for far
greater periods of time, can be readily deployed abroad, and can be used effectively in both alliance and
coalition forces.
With respect to their roles as a surveillance platform, this ability could be filled more cost effectively
through increased air patrols, or through the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which can stand
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far off of a potential target without being detected, the same role that submarines are supposed to play.
The other argument often advanced is that without the submarines the intelligence sharing between our
Navy and others which possess such technology will be hampered, possibly representing a threat to
Canada’s sovereignty. Once again the Canadian expertise in anti-submarine warfare would in all
likelihood off-set this capability. 
Canadian Reserve Forces
The structure of the Air, Army and Navy Reserve has been the subject of significant debate over the past
decade. The Navy Reserve has been the most successful in maintaining relevance. The Navy has made the
decision to provide operational taskings to the Navy Reserve, providing the element with a raison d’etre,
a platform relevant to their role - the Kingston Class Minor Coastal Defence Vessel, thus providing a cost
effective way of fulfilling some of the Navy’s responsibilities. In contrast, the Army and Air Force have
been slow to respond to changing military requirements. While some efforts have been made to eliminate
duplicated costs by amalgamating the logistical support of militia units, their roles have not been updated
in a significant manner over the past 50 years. The militia currently is viewed as a means of providing a
surge capability to the CF in the case of a protracted crisis.
The obvious problem is that the nature and speed of warfare has changed dramatically from when this
doctrine was put in place. We are no longer in a world where we can spend time fielding forces and bring
the level of training up to an acceptable level. As such maintaining a large number of militia units with
the main responsibility being providing trained infantrymen is outdated. This does not mean that all such
units should be eliminated, but rather that many of them should be reoriented towards other roles. This
also means that the government has to find another way to maintain staffing levels on peacekeeping
missions that too often have come to rely on reserve units. Conversely in some circumstances
peacekeeping may be best done entirely by reservists if the situation is of a low threat level, such as was
seen in Cyprus for the last decade of Canadian involvement.
The reserve forces do play an important role in maintaining a military presence in communities across the
country. However, to make them of more direct use to Canada and its security, employment protection
should be introduced that would enable the use of these men and women. Currently their use is voluntary
and as such cannot be relied upon in any significant numbers. The participation of reservists in
peacekeeping and other activities is a testament to their dedication rather than the support they receive
from the government. 
Contrary to the 1994 White Paper, reserve units should not be seen primarily as “replacement personnel
for com bat units”. The roles of militia units should be tailored to provide niche skills to the CF that are
beneficial to a reconceptualized security policy. Growing out of a human security  orientation, some units
could, for instance, be responsible to run water purification facilities, of establishing refugee camps, or
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providing the Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defence (NBCD) capabilities that one fears may one day
be required. After September 11th 2001, the risk of massive destruction to urban centres is a reality that
we are forced to confront. The militias represent the closest military forces to virtually every major urban
centre in Canada. As such every major city should have at least one reserve unit that focuses on disaster
relief or defence against NBC attacks.
• Parliament should enact legislation providing job protection for reserve personnel;
• Units should be given roles that complement the regular forces; and
• Specific capabilities for the response to disasters should reside within reserve units.
Joint Task Force 2
The existence of Canada’s Joint Task Force 2 has received a great deal of media coverage over the past
few years and has been the subject of even greater speculation. Its role in Afghanistan, while poorly
understood, represented an important contribution to the American led mission. JTF2 then represents a
niche capability that can effectively and meaningfully contribute to allied operations. This allows Canada
to meet some of its obligations under NATO, and to demonstrate to the United States that it is willing and
capable of contributing to international security. Furthermore, it is a unit that has an obvious use in
counter-terrorism within Canada and abroad. Due to its high state of readiness, training and capabilities,
JTF2 is able to fill the void between police action and military action involving a much larger deployment
of weaponry and personnel. The continued viability of Canada’s special forces is seen as essential to
meeting Canada’s security needs. One also might imagine such an enhanced capability being useful to
future UN sponsored operations, again placing Canada in the position of providing highly specialized
support to the multilateral peace and security environment.
While the maintenance of secrecy is important for its continued usefulness as an elite commando force,
the lack of parliamentary oversight runs counter to the Canadian values of democratic governance which
are a corner stone of our security policy. Parliamentary oversight, or the imposition of an independent
watchdog that could report directly to Parliament, should be put in place.
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)
The Disaster Assistance Response Team is a particular resource residing within DND which has proven to
be a valuable foreign policy tool. The DART has been dispatched both within Canada and abroad to
respond to a variety of disasters. The group has been sent to Honduras, Florida and Turkey to provide
immediate relief which the local governm ents are unable to provide due to the scope of the disaster. This
capability has been able to ease the suffering of peoples and to assist in the return to a condition of
stability within the affected regions. Besides the capability that DART possesses to ease suffering in an
environmental emergency, it also fills a capability gap in responding to terrorist attacks making use of
weapons of mass destruction. DART is the logical starting point to build a capability to assist in the
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response to, and clean-up, of biological, chemical or nuclear attacks. DART also could be viewed as an
important contributor to Canada’s human security policy.
Presently personnel are assigned to DART as a secondary duty. The result is that the team is not
guaranteed to be available for deployment. As was discussed, the security interests of Canada depend on a
stable international environment, additionally Canada has a responsibility to provide assistance to the
developing world as well as to aid its allies. The provision of DART provides a means by which Canada
can meet some of these obligations. It is our recommendation that DART be stood up as a formal unit
with the added mandate of providing a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence capability.
Conclusion
This paper has grown out of the Critical Defence Project being coordinated by the York Centre for
International and Security Studies at York University, and has received support from the Security and
Defence Forum centres across Canada. The April 2003 symposium put a number of questions to the
participants (Appendix 1) and asked them to speak to the issues in a general manner; these questions can
be found in Appendix 2. Due to very positive feedback, the Project is evolving to include commissioned
research which has as its goal the publication of a text that will fill a gap in Canadian security studies as
well as to provide an essential teaching aid to Canadian defence studies. In addition the Critical Defence
Project will continue to contribute to the debate on defence policy within Canada and to urge the
government to implement changes within the CF that will provide the country with the military it will
need to fulfill its international obligations in the years to come.
This paper has been an initial examination of the issue of a Canadian defence policy and has argued that
Canada must initiate a comprehensive review of defence policy, a process that must be undertaken in
conjunction with a foreign policy review. These reviews must make clear what Canada’s security interests
are presently, and what they are likely to be in the future, prior to considering a risk assessm ent. It is only
after this is done that a study of Canada’s force structure can be undertaken. Moreover, any truly serious
planning must be prepared to think outside the conventions established during the Cold War and
maintained as the dominant ethos with the CF and DND. Canada is different; the international security
and threat environments are different; the Canadian government’s capabilities are different.
We have laid out one initial position on how Canada’s military should be re-organised to ensure that the
government has the ability to use the CF as an effective tool of foreign policy. Our starting position is not
much different from that articulated over the past half century: that the CF must be prepared to function in
a range of operations from the traditional war fighting, through robust peacekeeping in volatile and
hostile environments through peacemaking to peacebuilding in traumatized societies struggling with post-
conflict reconstruction. These roles demand a military capable of short term independent activity, rapid
mobility, advanced military technology and a high level of professionalism. However, we do not believe
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that it is possible for Canada to continue to be “fully combat capable” if this is defined as being able to
field the full range of combat capabilities. Canada necessarily is forced to rely on coalition forces in any
modern war, a reality that has been confronting the CF since the first Gulf War. In short Canada must
make a number of difficult decisions of which capabilities to retain, and which must be jettisoned to
ensure that the overall military is able to continue to be relevant to Canada and its allies. 
To do so it will be necessary to ask basic questions about the CF, what its roles and responsibilities are,
and what Canada is prepared to fund. Finally, we must re-iterate that this does not mean a military that is
inexpensive; indeed, the outcome of the review process will most likely result in a call for increased
defence spending. However, it does mean that the defence spending must be as effective as possible and
ensure that the forces that are put in place are those that will be required. This requires a prior articulation
by DFAIT of Canada’s priorities in being prepared to contribute meaningfully to international peace and
security, just as it requires a clarification by DND along with other parts of the Canadian government of a
coherent national strategy to address current and possibly threats to domestic peace and security.
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Appendix 1
List of Participants in the Critical Defence Project symposium, 11 April 2003
Speakers:
David Dewitt and Ryerson Christie (Centre for International and Security Studies, York University)
Opening Remarks
Barbara Van Haute (Carleton University)
Asymmetric Threats and C4ISR Needs
Sara Roberts Pash (University of Victoria)
Post 9/11 and Ethical needs of the CF
Haider Nizamani (Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad)
Post 9/11 Strategies to Combat Terrorism and Changing Public Values and Expectations in the Muslim
World
Peggy Mason (The Norman Patterson School for International Relations, Carleton University)
International Law or the Law of the Jungle: Whither Canadian Defence Policy?
Ryerson Christie and Kyle Grayson (Centre for International and Security Studies, York University)
Human Security and Implications for Defence Planning
Scott Fogden (Cultural Diversity Institute, University of Calgary) 
‘Security’ in a Changing International Environment
Tami Jacoby (Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba) 
Civil Society Policing and the CF
Andrew Latham (Macalester College) 
The Transformation of War, Warfare and Warfighting: Implications for the CF
Samantha Arnold (Centre for International and Security Studies, York University) 
Irreconcilable differences? Cultural Diversity and Military Culture
Deborah Harrison (University of New Brunswick) and Lucie Laliberte (Children’s Aid Society of
Hamilton) 
They Also Serve: Quality of Life Issues for Canadian Forces Spouses and Children
Martin Shadwick (Centre for International and Security Studies, York University) 
Non-Military Roles of CF Equipment
Scot Robertson (Royal Military College of Canada) 
Inside the Iron Triangle: The Current Defence Dilemma and the Scope for the Future
Andrew Richter (University of Windsor) 
Strategic Ambitions, Military Capabilities, and Fiscal Realities: Future Options for the Canadian Forces
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Other attendees:
Elizabeth Dauphinée (Centre for International and Security Studies)
Cristina Masters (Centre for International and Security Studies)
David Mutimer (Centre for International and Security Studies)
Christopher Spearin (Centre for International and Security Studies)
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Appendix 2 - Call for Papers
Critical Defence Project – Symposium – 11 April 2003
In developing the Defence Update the Department of National Defence has laid out a series of trends and
challenges that face Canada and the Canadian Forces (CF). These trends are to be used as the basis for
policy planning and to establish the bounds of the debate on defence policy within Canada. However,
these trends themselves are left unchallenged and their relevance and impact are not adequately debated.
This provides an ideal location for the project to cut into the debate and to provide an important
contribution to the ongoing review. An exploration of the trends and challenges will in part demonstrate
that the manner in which the trends and challenges are constructed can effectively preclude policy
options. A breakdown of the ten trends, and a very brief explanation of DND’s approach to them, can be
found at: www.forces.gc.ca/menu/consult/current_policy/defence_portfolio/section_11_e.asp
To quickly summarize, the list is as follows: Changing International Environment; Post September 11;
Changing Nature of Military Operations; Rapid Pace of Technological Change; Increasing Operational
Tempo; Enhancing the Quality of Life of Canadian Forces Personnel; Changing Public Values and
Expectations; Reform and Cultural Change; and Defence Reduction.
Papers should critically examine one of the trends laid out by DND. While the author’s approach, and
whether it is narrowly or broadly focussed, will depend on the individual, there are four general questions
that the papers should address:
1. How does the trend limit discussion on defence policy?
2. How can the trend be opened up?
3. What is not being asked?
4. What are the implications of a critical analysis of the trend for defence policy in Canada?
